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Abstract
It is shown that the basic equations of quantum theory can be obtained from a straightforward application
of logical inference to experiments for which there is uncertainty about individual events and for which the
frequencies of the observed events are robust with respect to small changes in the conditions under which
the experiments are carried out.
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1. Introduction
Quantum theory has proven to be extraordinary powerful to describe a vast amount of very different
experiments in (sub)-atomic, molecular and condensed matter physics, quantum optics and so on. Remark-
ably, after so many extremely successful practical applications, there are still hot debates about conceptual
backgrounds of quantum theory, and attempts to clarify the success continue until now.5
The success of quantum theory reminds us of an example of another very successful theory, namely
classical thermodynamics. Einstein said: “Classical thermodynamics is the only physical theory of universal
content which I am convinced will never be overthrown, within the framework of applicability of its basic
concepts” [1]. Can we say that we understand the reasons of this success from the point of view of a more
fundamental theory? Strictly speaking, a rigorous derivation of, say, the second law of thermodynamics10
from classical (or quantum) mechanics is lacking and therefore the answer should be “no” but in practice
this does not matter too much. Our belief in thermodynamics is not based on mathematical deduction but
on its power to account for everyday experience.
It has been emphasized many times that our description of physical phenomena at some level of obser-
vation is essentially independent of our view of “underlying” levels [2]. In the present paper, we apply the15
same world view to nonrelativistic quantum theory. Adopting this view immediately distinguishes our line
of thinking from approaches that assume an underlying ontology [3, 4, 5, 6, 7] or formulate quantum theory
Email addresses: h.a.de.raedt@rug.nl (Hans De Raedt), M.Katsnelson@science.ru.nl (Mikhail I. Katsnelson),
k.michielsen@fz-juelich.de (Kristel Michielsen)
1Corresponding author
Preprint submitted to Annals of Physics June 3, 2014
starting from various sets of axioms [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26,
27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36]. We start with something that is as reliable as one can imagine, which
in our view, are the principles of logical inference [37, 38, 39, 40, 41] (a brief, formal introduction is given20
below) and ask the question: what should be added to these principles in order to derive, for instance, the
(nonrelativistic) Schro¨dinger equation? The answer is that it suffices to add Bohr’s correspondence principle
in a probabilistic sense.
The present work explores the possibility of exploiting logical inference [37, 38, 39, 40, 41] that is inductive
reasoning to give a rational explanation for the success of quantum theory as a description of a vast class25
of physical phenomena. We are not concerned with the various interpretations [19, 42, 43, 44] of quantum
theory.
We introduce the basic ideas of our approach by starting with a few quotes of Niels Bohr:
1. There is no quantum world. There is only an abstract physical description. It is wrong to think that
the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about nature [45].30
2. Physics is to be regarded not so much as the study of something a priori given, but rather as the
development of methods of ordering and surveying human experience. In this respect our task must be
to account for such experience in a manner independent of individual subjective judgment and therefore
objective in the sense that it can be unambiguously communicated in ordinary human language [46].
3. The physical content of quantum mechanics is exhausted by its power to formulate statistical laws35
governing observations under conditions specified in plain language [46].
The first two sentences of the first quote may be read as a suggestion to dispose of, in Mermin’s words [47],
the “bad habit” to take mathematical abstractions as the reality of the events (in the everyday sense of the
word) that we experience through our senses. Although widely circulated, these sentences are reported by
Petersen [45] and there is doubt that Bohr actually used this wording [48]. The last two sentences of the first40
quote and the second quote suggest that we should try to describe human experiences (confined to the realm
of scientific inquiry) in a manner and language which is unambiguous and independent of the individual
subjective judgment. Of course, the latter should not be construed to imply that the observed phenomena
are independent of the choices made by the individual(s) in performing the scientific experiment [49].
The third quote suggests that quantum theory is a powerful language to describe a certain class of45
statistical experiments but remains vague about the properties of the class. Similar views were expressed
by other fathers of quantum mechanics, e.g., Max Born and Wolfgang Pauli [50]. They can be summarized
as “Quantum theory describes our knowledge of the atomic phenomena rather than the atomic phenomena
themselves”. Our aim is, in a sense, to replace the philosophical components of these statements by well-
defined mathematical concepts and to carefully study their relevance for physical phenomena. Specifically,50
by applying the general formalism of logical inference to a well-defined class of statistical experiments, the
present paper shows that quantum theory is indeed the kind of language envisaged by Bohr.
Theories such as Newtonian mechanics, Maxwell’s electrodynamics, and Einstein’s (general) relativity
are deductive in character. Starting from a few axioms, abstracted from experimental observations and ad-
ditional assumptions about the irrelevance of a large number of factors for the description of the phenomena55
of interest, deductive reasoning is used to prove or disprove unambiguous statements, propositions, about
the mathematical objects which appear in the theory.
The method of deductive reasoning conforms to the Boolean algebra of propositions. The deductive,
reductionist methodology has the appealing feature that one can be sure that the propositions are either
right or wrong, and disregarding the possibility that some of the premises on which the deduction is built60
may not apply, there is no doubt that the conclusions are correct. Clearly, these theories successfully describe
a wide range of physical phenomena in a manner and language which is unambiguous and independent of
the individual.
At the same time, the construction of a physical theory, and a scientific theory in general, from “first
principles” is, for sure, not something self-evident, and not even safe. Our basic knowledge always starts65
from the middle, that is, from the world of macroscopic objects. According to Bohr, the quantum theoretical
description crucially depends on the existence of macroscopic objects which can be used as measuring devices.
For an extensive analysis of the quantum measurement process from a dynamical point of view see Ref. [51].
2
Most importantly, the description of the macroscopic level is robust, that is, essentially independent of the
underlying “more fundamental” picture [2]. As will be seen later, formalizing the notion of “robustness” is70
key to derive the basic equations of quantum theory from the general framework of logical inference.
Key assumptions of the deductive approach are that the mathematical description is a complete descrip-
tion of the experiment under consideration and that there is no uncertainty about the conditions under
which the experiment is carried out. If the theory does not fully account for all the relevant aspects of
the phenomenon that we wish to describe, the general rules by which we deduce whether a proposition is75
true or false can no longer be used. However, in these circumstances, we can still resort to logical infer-
ence [37, 38, 39, 40, 41] to find useful answers to unambiguous questions. Of course, in general it will no longer
be possible to say whether a proposition is true or false, hence there will always remain a residue of doubt.
However, as will be shown, the description obtained through logical inference may also be unambiguous and
independent of the individual.80
In the present paper, we demonstrate that the basic equations of quantum theory directly follow from
logical inference applied to experiments in which there is
(i) uncertainty about individual events,
(ii) the stringent condition that certain properties of the collection of events are reproducible, meaning
that they are robust with respect to small changes in the conditions under which the experiments are85
carried out.
It is the latter that renders the theoretical description unambiguous and independent of the individual. In
addition, our work provides a rational foundation for Bohr’s philosophical viewpoints embodied in quotes
(1–3).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a brief introduction to the algebra of logical90
inference [37, 38, 39, 40, 41], a mathematical framework which formalizes the patterns of plausible reasoning
exposed by Po´lya [52]. This mathematically precise formalism expresses what most people would consider
to be rational reasoning. The key concept is the notion of the plausibility that a proposition is true given
that another proposition is true. Section 3 discusses the role of uncertainties in experiments and classifies
their theoretical descriptions. In Section 4, we show in detail how logical inference can be used to derive95
the quantum theoretical description of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm thought experiment without
invoking a single concept of quantum theory. Section 5 uses the Stern-Gerlach experiment to illustrate how
the approach of Section 2 may be extended by adding features abstracted from the experiment. These two
sections are based on earlier attempts to derive the expressions of quantum theory by logical inference [53, 54].
Finally, we demonstrate that the time-independent (Section 6) and time-dependent (Section 7) Schro¨dinger100
equation can be derived by logical inference from the assumption that the experiment yields reproducible
data. A discussion of general aspects of our approach and conclusions are given in Section 8.
2. The algebra of logical inference
Obviously, any attempt to capture the process of human reasoning by which the events are registered by
our senses and are brought in relation to each other, leading to abstract concepts, is bound to create more105
problems than we can solve at this time. However, if we are only concerned about quantifying the truth of
a proposition given the truth of another proposition, it is possible to construct a mathematical framework,
an extension of Boolean logic, that allows us to reason in a manner which is unambiguous and independent
of the individual, in particular if there are elements of uncertainty in the description [37, 38, 39, 40, 41].
In this section, we briefly introduce the concepts that are necessary for the purpose of the present110
paper. For a detailed discussion of the foundations of plausible reasoning, its relation to Boolean logic
and the derivation of the rules of logical inference, the reader is advised to consult the papers [37, 40] and
books [38, 39, 41] from which our summary has been extracted.
We start by listing three so-called “desiderata” from which the algebra of logical inference can be de-
rived [38, 39, 40, 41]. The formulation which follows is taken from Ref. [40].115
Desideratum 1. Plausibilities are represented by real numbers. The plausibility that a proposition A is
true conditional on proposition B being true will be denoted by P (A|B).
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Desideratum 2. Plausibilities must exhibit agreement with rationality. As more and more evidence sup-
porting the truth of a proposition becomes available, the plausibility should increase
monotonically and continuously and the plausibility of the negation of the proposition120
should decrease monotonically and continuously. Moreover, in the limiting cases that the
proposition A is known to be either true or false, the plausibility P (A|B) should conform
to the rules of deductive reasoning. In other words, plausibilities must be in qualitative
agreement with the patterns of plausible reasoning uncovered by Po´lya [52].
Desideratum 3. All rules relating plausibilities must be consistent. Consistency of rational reasoning de-125
mands that if the rules of logical inference allow a plausibility to be obtained in more
than one way, the result should not depend on the particular sequence of operations.
These three desiderata only describe the essential features of the plausibilities and definitely do not constitute
a set of axioms which plausibilities have to satisfy. It is a most remarkable fact that these desiderata suffice
to uniquely determine the set of rules by which plausibilities may be manipulated [38, 39, 40, 41].130
Omitting the derivation, it follows that plausibilities may be chosen to take numerical values in the range
[0, 1] and obey the rules [38, 39, 40, 41]
a. P (A|Z) +P (A¯|Z) = 1 where A¯ denotes the negation of proposition A and Z is a proposition assumed to
be true.
b. P (AB|Z) = P (A|BZ)P (B|Z) = P (B|AZ)P (A|Z) where the “product” BZ denotes the logical product135
(conjunction) of the propositions B and Z, that is the proposition BZ is true if both B and Z are true.
This rule will be referred to as “product rule”. It should be mentioned here that it is not allowed to
define a plausibility for a proposition conditional on the conjunction of mutual exclusive propositions.
Reasoning on the basis of two of more contradictory premises is out of the scope of the present paper.
c. P (AA¯|Z) = 0 and P (A+A¯|Z) = 1 where the “sum” A+B denotes the logical sum (inclusive disjunction)140
of the propositions A and B, that is the proposition A + B is true if either A or B or both are true.
These two rules show that Boolean algebra is contained in the algebra of plausibilities.
The rules (a–c) are unique. Any other rule which applies to plausibilities represented by real numbers and
is in conflict with rules (a–c) will be at odds with rational reasoning and consistency [39, 40, 41].
The reader will no doubt recognize that rules (a–c) are identical to the rules by which we manipulate145
probabilities [41, 55, 56, 57]. However, the rules (a–c) were not postulated. They were derived from
general considerations about rational reasoning and consistency only. Moreover, concepts such as sample
spaces, probability measures etc., which are an essential part of the mathematical foundation of probability
theory [56, 57], play no role in the derivation of rules (a–c). In fact, if Kolmogorov’s axiomatic formulation of
probability theory would have been in conflict with rules (a–c), we believe that this formulation would long150
have been disposed of because it would yield results which are in conflict with rational reasoning. Perhaps
most important in the context of quantum theory is that in the logical inference approach uncertainty about
an event does not imply that this event can be represented by a random variable as defined in probability
theory [57].
We emphasize that there is a significant conceptual difference between “mathematical” probabilities and155
plausibilities. Mathematical probabilities are elements of an axiomatic framework which complies with the
algebra of logical inference. Plausibilities are elements of a language which also complies with the algebra
of logical inference and serve to facilitate communication, in an unambiguous and consistent manner, about
phenomena in which there is uncertainty.
The plausibility P (A|B) is an intermediate mental construct that serves to carry out inductive logic,160
that is rational reasoning, in a mathematically well-defined manner [39]. Plausibilities are concepts resulting
from human reasoning about observed events and their relationships but are not the “cause” of these events.
In general, P (A|B) may express the degree of belief of an individual that proposition A is true, given
that proposition B is true. However, in the present paper, we explicitly exclude applications of this kind
because they do not comply with our main goal, namely to describe phenomena “in a manner independent165
of individual subjective judgment”, see Bohr’s quote (2).
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To take away this subjective connotation of the word “plausibility”, from now on we will simply
call P (A|B) the “inference-probability” or “i-prob” for short.
The algebra of logical inference is the foundation for powerful tools such as the maximum entropy method
and Bayesian analysis [39, 41]. Although not formulated in the language of logical inference used in the
present paper, Jaynes’ papers on the relation between information and (quantum) statistical mechanics [58,170
59] are perhaps the first to “derive” theoretical descriptions using this general methodology of scientific
reasoning. As we show in this paper, quantum theory also derives from the application of the algebra of
logical inference.
It is important to keep in mind that the rules of logical inference are not bound by “the laws of physics”.
In particular, logical inference also applies to situations where there are no causal relations between the175
events [39, 41]. The point of view taken in this paper is that the laws of physics should provide a consistent
description of relations between certain events that we perceive by our senses and therefore they should
conform to the rules of logical inference. Although extracting cause-and-effect relationships from empirical
evidence by rational reasoning should follow the rules of logical inference, in general the latter cannot be
used to establish cause-and-effect relationships [41, 60, 61].180
A comment on the notation used throughout this paper is in order. To simplify the presentation, we
make no distinction between an event such as “detector D has fired” and the corresponding proposition
“D = detector D has fired”. If we have two detectors, say Dx where x = ±1, we write P (x|Z) to denote the
i-prob of the proposition that detector Dx fires, given that proposition Z is true. Similarly, the i-prob of the
proposition that two detectors Dx and Dy fire, given that proposition Z is true, is denoted by P (x, y|Z).185
Obviously, this notation generalizes to more than two propositions.
3. Quantum theory as an instance of logical inference
The theoretical description of “classical physics” applies to phenomena for which there is absolute cer-
tainty about the outcome of each individual experiment on each individual object [62, 63, 64]. In mapping
the experimental data which are necessarily represented by a limited number of bits, that is by integers, onto190
the theoretical abstractions in terms of real numbers, it is assumed that the necessarily finite precision of
the experiment can be increased without limit, at least in principle, and that there is a one-to-one mapping
between the values of the variables in the theory and the values of the corresponding quantities measured
in experiment.
In real experiments there is always uncertainty about some factors which may or may not influence the195
outcome of the measurements. In the realm of classical physics, standard techniques of statistical analysis
are used to deal with this issue. It is postulated that these “imperfections” in the experimental data are
not of fundamental importance but are technical in nature and can therefore be eliminated, at least in
principle [62, 63, 64].
Quantum theory is fundamentally different from classical theories in that there may be uncertainties200
about each individual event, uncertainties which cannot be eliminated, not even in principle [62, 63, 64].
Clearly, this is a statement about the theory, not about the observed phenomena themselves. The outcome
of a real experiment, be it on “classical” or “quantum” objects, is always subject to uncertainties in the
conditions under which the experiment is carried out. However, this issue is not of direct concern to us
here because we only want to explore whether the quantum theoretical description, not the phenomena205
themselves, can be derived from logical inference applied to certain thought experiments.
Summarizing, we may classify theoretical abstractions of scientific experiments as follows:
Category 1. The conditions under which the experiment is carried out are known and fixed for the duration
of the experiment and there is no uncertainty about each event.
Category 2. Each event under known conditions is certain but the conditions under which the experiment210
is carried out may be uncertain.
Category 3. There may be uncertainty about each event and the conditions under which the experiment
is carried may be uncertain.
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A laboratory experiment always falls in category 3. In a strict sense, numerical experiments on a digital
computer belong to category 1. However, disregarding the fact that in the course of the numerical experiment215
the time-evolution of each individual bit of the computer is completely determined and known, in practice,
the complexity of the numerical simulation is often so large that the variables of interest may exhibit behavior
that is similar to the one observed in experiments belonging to category 2 and 3.
In the theoretical description of a real experiment, it makes sense to simplify matters by first exploring
models that belong to category 1 (classical physics) and if no satisfactory description is obtained to consider220
models of category 2 (classical physics supplemented with probability theory). If the latter fails to describe
the experiment too, we can still try models in category 3.
The fact that laboratory experiments always belong to category 3 has an important implication. A basic
requirement for any scientific experiment is that the analysis of the data yields quantities (e.g. frequencies,
averages, correlations, etc.) that exhibit a high degree of reproducibility. Only then it may make sense to225
attempt drawing scientifically meaningful conclusions from these data. Clearly, this requirement restricts the
uncertainties on the conditions under which the experiment is carried out. If these uncertainties fluctuate
wildly with each measurement, it is unreasonable to expect reproducible results.
Therefore, it seems justified to limit attention to a subset of theoretical models of category 3 which
satisfies the following criteria:230
Category 3a. There may be uncertainty about each event. The conditions under which the experiment is
carried out may be uncertain. The frequencies with which events are observed are repro-
ducible and robust against small changes in the conditions.
As we show in this paper, the rules of logical inference applied to models belonging to category 3a rather
straightforwardly lead to the basic equations of quantum theory. The derivation has a generic structure.235
The first step is to list the features of the experiment that are deemed to be relevant and to introduce the
i-probs of the individual events. The second step is to impose the condition that the experiment yields
reproducible results, not on the level of individual events, but on the level of averages of many events. The
result of the second step is a functional of the i-prob, the minimum of which yields an expression for the
i-prob which is identical to the corresponding probability obtained from the quantum theoretical description240
of the experiment.
4. Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm thought experiment
As a first illustration, we consider Bohm’s version of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen thought experiment [65,
66]. To head off possible misunderstandings, the derivation presented in this section does not add anything
to the ongoing discussions about locality, realism, etc. in relation to the violation of Bell-like inequalities [54,245
67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81].
We choose the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm (EPRB) thought experiment as the first example because
it seems to be the simplest nontrivial model for demonstrating how the logical inference approach works.
Indeed, a straightforward application of the ideas of Section 3 yields an expression for the i-prob to observe
detection events which is identical to the probability distribution obtained from the quantum theoretical250
description in terms of the singlet state of two spin-1/2 particles [66, 82].
4.1. Experiment
The layout of the EPRB thought experiment is shown in Fig. 1. In contrast to the conventional quantum
theoretical description [66, 82], we keep the number of assumptions about the experiment itself to a minimum.
Specifically, we assume that255
a. Each time the source S is activated, it sends a signal to the left and another one to the right. For
the present purpose, it is not necessary to make any assumption about the nature of or the correlation
between these two signals.
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Figure 1: (Color online) Diagram of the EPRB thought experiment. The source S, activated at times labeled by n = 1, 2, . . . , N ,
sends a signal to the router R1 and another signal to the router R2. Depending on the orientations of the routers, represented
by unit vectors a1 and a2, the signal going to the left (right) is detected with 100% certainty by either D+,1 or D−,1 (D+,2
or D
−,2).
b. The observation station i = 1, 2 contains a “router” Ri which sends the signal to either detector D+,i or
detector D−,i. The decision to send the signal to either D+,i or D−,i depends on the directions ai of the260
router Ri, ai being a three-dimensional unit vector. The orientations of the routers are relative to the
fixed laboratory frame of reference.
c. The detectors register the signal and operate with 100% efficiency, that is, if n = 1, 2, . . . , N labels the
time at which the source is activated, the firing of the detectors produces a pair of integers {xn, yn} where
xn = ±1 (yn = ±1) represents the firing of D±,1 (D±,2).265
The result of a run of the experiment for fixed a1 and a2 is a data set of pairs
Υ = {xn, yn|xn = ±1; yn = ±1;n = 1, . . . , N}, (1)
where N is the total number of signal pairs emitted by the source. From the data set Eq. (1), we compute
the averages
〈x〉 = 1
N
N∑
i=1
xi , 〈y〉 = 1
N
N∑
i=1
yi, (2)
the correlation and coincidences
〈xy〉 = 1
N
N∑
i=1
xiyi , nxy =
N∑
i=1
δx,xiδy,yi, (3)
which represents the number of events of the type {x, y}. The assumptions (a–c) and Eqs. (2) – (3) represent270
our perception about the experiment and specify the data analysis procedure, respectively.
4.2. Inference-probability of the data produced by the experiment
The next step is to formalize the general features of the possible outcomes of the experiment.
1. The i-prob to observe a pair {x, y} is denoted by P (x, y|a1, a2, Z) where Z represents all the conditions
under which the experiment is performed, with exception of the directions a1 and a2 of the routers R1275
and R2, respectively. It is assumed that the conditions represented by Z are fixed and identical for all
experiments.
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It is not difficult to see that any real-valued function f(x, y) of two dichotomic variables x, y = ±1 can
be written as
f(x, y) =
(1− x)(1 − y)f(−1,−1) + (1 + x)(1 − y)f(+1,−1)
4
+
(1− x)(1 + y)f(−1,+1)+ (1 + x)(1 + y)f(+1,+1)
4
=
f(−1,−1) + f(+1,−1) + f(−1,+1) + f(+1,+1)
4
+x
−f(−1,−1) + f(+1,−1)− f(−1,+1)+ f(+1,+1)
4
+y
−f(−1,−1)− f(+1,−1) + f(−1,+1) + f(+1,+1)
4
+xy
f(−1,−1)− f(+1,−1)− f(−1,+1)+ f(+1,+1)
4
.
(4)
From this general identity, it immediately follows that P (x, y|a1, a2, Z) can be written as280
P (x, y|a1, a2, Z) = E0(a1, a2, Z) + xE1(a1, a2, Z) + yE2(a1, a2, Z) + xyE12(a1, a2, Z)
4
, (5)
where
E0(a1, a2, Z) =
∑
x,y=±1
P (x, y|a1, a2, Z) = 1,
E1(a1, a2, Z) =
∑
x,y=±1
xP (x, y|a1, a2, Z),
E2(a1, a2, Z) =
∑
x,y=±1
yP (x, y|a1, a2, Z),
E12(a1, a2, Z) =
∑
x,y=±1
xyP (x, y|a1, a2, Z). (6)
Furthermore, from Eq. (6) and rule (a) (see section 2), it follows directly that |E1(a1, a2, Z)| ≤ 1,
|E2(a1, a2, Z)| ≤ 1, and |E12(a1, a2, Z)| ≤ 1.
2. For simplicity, it is assumed that there is no relation between the actual values of the pairs {xn, yn} and
{xn′ , yn′} if n 6= n′. In other words, as far as we know, each repetition of the experiment represents285
an identical event of which the outcome is logically independent of any other such event. In probability
theory, events with these properties are called Bernoulli trials, a concept that is central to many results
in probability theory [39, 57, 41]. Invoking the product rule, the logical consequence of this assumption
is that
P (x1, y1, . . . , xN , yN |a1, a2, Z) = P (x1, y1|x2, y2, . . . , xN , yN , a1, a2, Z)P (x2, y2, . . . , xN , yN |a1, a2, Z)
= P (x1, y1|a1, a2, Z)P (x2, y2, . . . , xN , yN |a1, a2, Z)
= P (x1, y1|a1, a2, Z)P (x2, y2|x3, y3, . . . , xN , yN , a1, a2, Z)
×P (x3, y3, . . . , xN , yN |a1, a2, Z)
= P (x1, y1|a1, a2, Z)P (x2, y2|a1, a2, Z)P (x3, y3, . . . , xN , yN |a1, a2, Z)
= . . .
=
N∏
i=1
P (xi, yi|a1, a2, Z), (7)
meaning that the i-prob P (x1, y1, . . . , xN , yN |a1, a2, Z) to observe the compound event {{x1, y1}, . . . , {xN , yN}}290
is completely determined by the i-prob P (x, y|a1, a2, Z) to observe the pair {x, y}.
8
3. It is assumed that the i-prob P (x, y|a1, a2, Z) to observe a pair {x, y} does not change if we apply the
same rotation to both routers R1 and R2. Expressing this invariance with respect to rotations of the
coordinate system (Euclidean space and Cartesian coordinates are used throughout this paper) in terms
of i-probs requires that P (x, y|a1, a2, Z) = P (x, y|Ra1,Ra2, Z) where R denotes an arbitrary rotation295
in three-dimensional space which is applied to both routers R1 and R2. As a function of the vectors a1
and a2, the functional equation P (x, y|a1, a2, Z) = P (x, y|Ra1,Ra2, Z) can only be satisfied for all a1,
a2 and rotations R if P (x, y|a1, a2, Z) is a function of the inner product a1 · a2 only. Therefore, we must
have
P (x, y|a1, a2, Z) = P (x, y|a1 · a2, Z) = P (x, y|θ, Z), (8)
where θ = arccos(a1 · a2) denotes the angle between the unit vectors a1 and a2. For any integer value of300
K, θ + 2πK represents the same physical arrangement of the routers R1 and R2.
4. According to the basic rules of logical inference, the i-prob to observe x, irrespective of the observed value
of y is given by
P (x|a1, a2, Z) =
∑
y=±1
P (x, y|a1, a2, Z). (9)
The assumption that observing x = +1 is as likely as observing x = −1, independent of the observed
value of y, implies that we must have P (x = +1|a1, a2, Z) = P (x = −1|a1, a2, Z) which, in view of305
the fact that P (x = +1|a1, a2, Z) + P (x = −1|a1, a2, Z) = 1 implies that P (x = +1|a1, a2, Z) =
P (x = −1|a1, a2, Z) = 1/2. Applying the same reasoning to the assumption that, independent of the
observed values of x, observing y = +1 is as likely as observing y = −1 yields P (y|a1, a2, Z) = P (x =
+1, y|a1, a2, Z) + P (x = −1, y|a1, a2, Z) = 1/2. Then, from Eq. (6) it follows directly that
E1(a1, a2, Z) = E2(a1, a2, Z) = 0. (10)
Assumptions (3) and (4) formalize our expectations about the symmetries of the experimental setup. Note310
that we did not assign any prior i-prob nor that at this stage, there is any reference to concepts such as the
singlet-state. Although the symmetry properties which have been assumed are reminiscent of those of the
singlet state, this is deceptive. As we show later, without altering the assumptions that are expressed in (3)
and (4), the logical-inference approach yields the correlations for triplet states as well. Using Eqs. (5), (6), (8),
and (10) we find that the i-prob to observe a pair {x, y} simplifies to315
P (x, y|θ, Z) = 1 + xyE12(θ)
4
, (11)
where E12(θ) = E12(a1, a2, Z) is a periodic function of θ.
4.3. Condition for reproducibility and robustness
Although the data set Eq. (1) changes from run to run, we expect that the averages Eq. (2), the correlation
and the coincidences Eq. (3) exhibit some kind of robustness, a smoothness with respect to small changes
of θ. If this were not the case, these numbers would vary erratically with θ. Most likely the results would320
be called “irreproducible”, and the experimental data would be disposed of because repeating the run with
a slightly different value of θ would often produce results that are very different from those of other runs.
Obviously, the important feature of robustness with respect to small variations of the conditions under
which the experiment is carried out should be reflected in the expression for the i-prob to observe data
sets which yield reproducible averages and correlations (with the usual statistical fluctuations). Having325
exploited all elementary knowledge about the experiment (see Sections 4.1 and 4.2), the next step therefore
is to determine the expression for P (x, y|θ, Z) which is most insensitive to small changes in θ.
Let us assume that for a fixed value of θ, an experimental run of N events yields nxy events of the type
{x, y} where n++ + n−+ + n+− + n−− = N . The number of different data sets yielding the same values of
n++, n−+, n+−, and n−− is N !/(n++)!(n−+)!(n+−)!(n−−)!. According to Eq. (7), the i-prob that events330
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of the type {x, y} occur nxy times is given by
∏
x,y=±1 P (x, y|θ, Z)nxy . Therefore, the i-prob to observe the
(compound) event {n++, n−+, n+−, n−−} is given by
P (n++, n−+, n+−, n−−|θ,N, Z) = N !
∏
x,y=±1
P (x, y|θ, Z)nxy
nxy!
. (12)
If the outcome of the experiment is indeed described by the i-prob Eq. (12) and the experiment is
supposed to yield reproducible, robust results, small changes of θ should not have a drastic effect on the
outcome. So let us ask ourselves how the i-prob would change if the experiment is carried out with θ+ ǫ (ǫ335
small) instead of with θ.
It is expedient to formulate this question as an hypothesis test. Let H0 and H1 be the hypothesis that
the data {n++, n−+, n+−, n−−} is observed if the angle between the unit vectors a1 and a2 is θ and θ + ǫ,
respectively. The evidence Ev of hypothesis H1, relative to hypothesis H0, is defined by [39, 41]
Ev = ln
P (n++, n−+, n+−, n−−|θ + ǫ,N, Z)
P (n++, n−+, n+−, n−−|θ,N, Z) , (13)
where the logarithm serves to facilitate the algebraic manipulations. If H1 is more (less) plausible than H0340
then Ev > 0 (Ev < 0).
The absolute value of the evidence, |Ev| is a measure for the robustness of the description (the sign of Ev
is arbitrary, hence irrelevant). The problem of determining the most robust description of the experimental
data may now be formulated as follows: search for the i-prob’s P (n++, n−+, n+−, n−−|θ,N, Z) which mini-
mize |Ev| for all possible ǫ (ǫ small) and for all possible θ. The condition “for all possible ǫ and θ” renders345
the minimization problem an instance of a robust optimization problem [83].
Obviously, this robust optimization problem has a trivial solution, namely P (n++, n−+, n+−, n−−|θ,N, Z)
independent of θ. For the case at hand, such P (n++, n−+, n+−, n−−|θ,N, Z)’s can only describe experiments
for which {n++, n−+, n+−, n−−} does not exhibit any dependence on θ, the angle between the vectors a1
and a2 which represent the direction of the routers R1 and R2.350
Experiments which produce results that do not change with the conditions do not increase our
knowledge about the relation between the conditions and the observed data. In this paper, we do
not consider such (fairly useless) experiments and consequently, we explicitly exclude solutions
for the i-probs that are constant with respect to the conditions.
Assume that we have found a set of i-prob’s P0(n++, n−+, n+−, n−−|θ,N, Z) which are not all constant
functions of θ and which minimize |Ev| for all ǫ (ǫ small). Call this minimum |Ev|0. Suppose that |Ev|0 itself
depends on θ, meaning that the robustness of the description varies with θ. Then, the found set of i-prob’s
is definitely not a solution of the robust optimization problem because it does not satisfy the condition that355
the solution must hold for all possible θ. Therefore, to solve the problem induced by the “for all possible θ”
clause, we require that at the minimum, |Ev| is independent of θ.
Summarizing: our concept of a robust experiment implies that the i-prob’s which describe such experi-
ment can be found by minimizing |Ev|, subject to the constraints that
(C1) ǫ is small but arbitrary.360
(C2) Not all i-prob’s are independent of θ.
(C3) |Ev| is independent of θ.
Although we have used a particular example to introduce and illustrate the concept of robustness, we will
use the same notion throughout this paper.
4.4. Robust solution365
Making use of Eq. (12), we find
Ev =
∑
x,y=±1
nxy ln
P (x, y|θ + ǫ, Z)
P (x, y|θ, Z) . (14)
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Writing Eq. (14) as a Taylor series in ǫ we have
Ev =
∑
x,y=±1
nxy
{
ǫ
P ′(x, y|θ, Z)
P (x, y|θ, Z) −
ǫ2
2
(
P ′(x, y|θ, Z)
P (x, y|θ, Z)
)2
+
ǫ2
2
P ′′(x, y|θ, Z)
P (x, y|θ, Z)
}
+O(ǫ3), (15)
where a prime denotes the derivative with respect to the variable θ.
According to our notion of robustness, the evidence Eq. (15) should change as little as possible as ǫ
varies. The contribution of the term in ǫ can be made to vanish by substituting nxy = αP (x, y|θ, Z). From370
N =
∑
x,y=±1
nxy = α
∑
x,y=±1
P (x, y|θ, Z) = α, (16)
it follows that α = N . Then we have∑
x,y=±1
nxy
P ′(x, y|θ, Z)
P (x, y|θ, Z) = N
∑
x,y=±1
P ′(x, y|θ, Z)
= N
∂
∂θ
∑
x,y=±1
P (x, y|θ, Z)
= N
∂
∂θ
1 = 0. (17)
Using the same reasoning, it follows that the third term in Eq. (15) also vanishes and we have
Ev = −Nǫ
2
2
∑
x,y=±1
1
P (x, y|θ, Z)
(
∂P (x, y|θ, Z)
∂θ
)2
+O(ǫ3). (18)
Although our choice P (x, y|θ, Z) = nxy/N is motivated by the desire to eliminate contributions of order
ǫ, it follows that our criterion of robustness leads us to the intuitively obvious procedure which assigns to
P (x, y|θ, Z) the value of the observed frequencies of occurrences nxy/N . As shown in Appendix A, for375
large N , the same procedure also follows from searching for the P (x, y|θ, Z)’s which maximize the i-prob to
observe {n++, n−+, n+−, n−−}.
Omitting terms of O(ǫ3), minimizing |Ev| while taking into account the constraints (C2) and (C3) (see
Section 4.3) amounts to finding the i-prob’s P (x, y|θ, Z) which minimize
IF =
∑
x,y=±1
1
P (x, y|θ, Z)
(
∂P (x, y|θ, Z)
∂θ
)2
, (19)
subject to the constraint that ∂P (x, y|θ, Z)/∂θ 6= 0 for some pairs (x, y). The r.h.s. of Eq. (19) is the Fisher380
information for the problem at hand and because of constraint (C3), does not depend on θ.
Using Eq. (11), we can rewrite Eq. (19) as
IF =
1
1− E212(θ)
(
∂E12(θ)
∂θ
)2
, (20)
which is readily integrated to yield
E12(θ) = cos
(
θ
√
IF + φ
)
. (21)
where φ is an integration constant.
As E12(θ) is a periodic function of θ we must have
√
IF = K where K is an integer and hence385
E12(θ) = cos (Kθ + φ) . (22)
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Because of constraint (C2) we exclude the case K = IF = 0 from further consideration because it
describes an experiment in which the frequency distribution of the observed data does not depend on θ.
Therefore, the physically relevant, nontrivial solution with minimum Fisher information corresponds to
K = 1. Furthermore, as E12(θ) is a function of a1 · a2 = cos θ only, we must have φ = 0, π, reflecting an
ambiguity in the definition of the direction of R1 relative to the direction of R2.390
Choosing the solution with φ = π, the two-particle correlation reads
E12(a1, a2, Z) = − cos θ = −a1 · a2, (23)
in agreement with the expression for the correlation of two S = 1/2 particles in the singlet state [66, 82].
4.5. Discussion
We have shown that the application of our criterion of robust, reproducible experiments to the EPRB
thought experiment depicted in Fig. 1 amounts to minimizing the Fisher information Eq. (21) for this specific395
problem. The result of this calculation is the correlation Eq. (23) which is characteristic for the singlet state.
Needless to say, our derivation did not use any concepts of quantum theory. Only plain, rational reasoning
strictly complying with the rules of logical inference and some elementary facts about the experiment were
used.
It is most remarkable that the equations of quantum theory for a system in the singlet state appear by400
simply requiring that (i) everything which is known about the source is uncertain, except that it emits two
signals, (ii) the routers R1 and R2 transform the received signal into two-valued signals, and that (iii) the
i-prob describing the frequencies of the observed events depends on the relative orientation of the routers
only, see Eq. (8). Apparently, the latter requirement suffices to recover the salient feature of the singlet state
of two spin-1/2 particles, namely that the state vector |ψ〉 = (| ↑↓〉 − | ↓↑〉) /√2 is invariant for rotations,405
implying that its physical properties do not depend on the direction chosen to define “up” or “down” [66, 82].
Realizing conditions (i) and (iii) in a real EPRB experiment is not a trivial matter [84, 85, 86].
The correlations that are characteristic for other entangled states for which Eq. (10) holds are obtained
by making different assumptions about the properties of the routers. As an example, assume that the output
of router R1 is determined by (−ax, ay,−az) instead of by (ax, ay, az). Repeating the derivation that leads410
to Eq. (23) yields E12(a1, a2, Z) = +a
x
1a
x
2 − ay1ay2 + az1az2, which, in quantum theory, is the correlation of
two S = 1/2 particles described by the state vector |ψ〉 = (| ↑↑〉+ | ↓↓〉) /√2, the triplet state with the
z-projection of total magnetization zero.
5. Stern-Gerlach experiment
The expression Eq. (23) for the correlation of the data produced by an EPRB experiment has been415
obtained without making specific assumptions about the nature of the signals. In this section, we add some
extra assumptions and we show how the same reasoning of Section 4 leads to the expression of a simple
quantum mechanical model of the Stern-Gerlach experiment, see Fig. 2. In order to avoid repetition, in
the following we leave out arguments/derivations/discussions which, with minor changes have been given
earlier.420
5.1. Experiment
We start by listing the assumptions about the nature of the signal and the action of the magnet on the
signal. Specifically, we assume that
a. The signal emitted by the source takes the form of a particle which carries a magnetic moment represented
by a unit vector S. The magnetic moment interacts with the magnetic field generated by the magnetM .425
This field is a function of the direction a of the magnet only. The direction of the magnetic moment and
magnet are relative to the fixed laboratory frame of reference.
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Figure 2: (Color online) Diagram of the Stern-Gerlach experiment. The source S, activated at times labeled by n = 1, 2, . . . , N ,
sends a particle carrying a magnetic moment S to the magnet M with its magnetization in the direction a. Depending on the
relative directions of a and S, the particle is detected with 100% certainty by either D+ or D−.
b. As the particle passes through the magnetic field, it is directed towards either D+ or D−. The mechanism
which causes this to happen is assumed to depend on a ·S = cos θ only. In other words, the distribution of
the number of particles detected by D+ or D− does not change (within the usual statistical fluctuations)430
if both the magnetic moment of the particles and the direction of the magnetic field are rotated by the
same amount. Obviously, this is just expressing the assumption that space is isotropic.
c. The detectors count the particles with 100% efficiency, that is, if n = 1, 2, . . . , N labels the time at which
the source is activated, the firing of the detectors produces a data set of integers {xn|xn = ±1;n =
1, . . . , N} where xn = ±1 represents the firing of D±.435
5.2. Inference-probability of the data produced by the experiment
In complete analogy with Section 4.2, we have
1. The i-prob to observe an event x = ±1 is denoted by P (x|a · S, Z) where Z represents all the conditions
under which the experiment is performed, with exception of the directions a of the magnet and S of
the magnetic moment of the particle. It is assumed that the conditions represented by Z are fixed and440
identical for all experiments. It is expedient to write P (x|a · S, Z) as
P (x|a · S, Z) = P (x|θ, Z) = 1 + xE(θ)
2
, (24)
where
E(θ) = E(a · S, Z) =
∑
x=±1
xP (x|θ, Z). (25)
2. For simplicity, it is assumed that there is no relation between the actual values of xn and xn′ if n 6= n′. In
other words, as far as we know, each repetition of the experiment represents an identical event of which
the outcome is logically independent of any other such event. Repeated application of the product rule445
yields
P (x1, . . . , xN |a · S, Z) =
N∏
i=1
P (xi|θ, Z), (26)
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meaning that the i-prob P (x|a · S, Z) to observe the event {x1, . . . , xN} is uniquely determined by the
i-prob to observe the event x.
5.3. Condition for reproducibility and robustness
Enforcing the condition of reproducibility, exactly the same reasoning that leads to Eq. (18) now yields450
Ev = −Nǫ
2
2
∑
x=±1
1
P (x|θ, Z)
(
∂P (x|θ, Z)
∂θ
)2
+O(ǫ3), (27)
from which it follows that in order to reduce the variation of Eq. (27) as a function of ǫ as much as possible,
we should minimize the Fisher information
IF =
∑
x=±1
1
P (x|θ, Z)
(
∂P (x|θ, Z)
∂θ
)2
=
1
1− E2(θ)
(
∂E(θ)
∂θ
)2
, (28)
subject to the constraint ∂P (x|θ, Z)/∂θ 6= 0. The method of solution is identical to the one employed in
Section 4.4. Using the fact that E(θ) is a function of a ·S = cos θ only, we find that there are two solutions,
namely E(θ) = ± cos θ. Therefore, we have455
P (x|a · S, Z) = P (x|θ, Z) = 1± xa · S
2
, (29)
in agreement with the expressions of the quantum theoretical expression for the probability to deflect the
particle in one of the two distinct directions labeled by x = ±1 [82]. The ± sign in Eq. (29) reflects the fact
that the mapping between x = ±1 and the two different directions is only determined up to a sign.
5.4. Discussion
In quantum theory, Eq. (29) is in essence just the postulate (Born’s rule) that the probability to observe460
the particle with spin up (corresponding to say x = +1) is given by the square of the absolute value of
the amplitude of the wavefunction projected onto the spin-up state [82]. Obviously, the variability of the
conditions under which an experiment is carried out is not included in the quantum theoretical description.
In contrast, in the logical inference approach, Eq. (29) is not postulated but follows from the assumption
that the (thought) experiment that is being performed yields the most reproducible results, revealing the465
conditions for an experiment to produce data which is described by quantum theory.
6. Particle in a potential: Schro¨dinger equation
Sections 4 and 5 showed that, with a minimum of input about the nature of an experiment, simply
demanding that the recorded data sets of events yield reproducible results for the i-probs, leads to expressions
that are known from the quantum theoretical treatment of the experiment. In essence, these results derive470
from the following ideas:
(i) The i-probs for events to occur obey the rules of the algebra of logical inference.
(ii) The i-prob to observe an event (labeled by {x, y} or x) depends explicitly on a variable condition
(represented by the variable θ).
(iii) Maximizing the robustness of the i-prob to observe the data with respect to small variations of the475
condition yields the functional dependence of the i-prob on this condition.
This section shows that extending this approach to a particle in a potential is straightforward. The key
points are to formulate precisely what it means to perform a robust, reproducible experiment and to feed
in knowledge about the Newtonian dynamics of the particle. We consider the time-independent case and to
keep the notation simple, we only treat the case of a particle on a line. The extension to 2- or 3-dimensional480
space and the time-dependent case is given in Section 7.
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6.1. Experiment
We consider the following experiment. A particle is located on a line segment [−L,L], relative to a fixed
reference frame. Its unknown position is denoted by θ. We have a source that emits a signal which always
solicits a response of the particle. We cover another line segment [−L,L] with 2M + 1 detectors of width485
∆, where M∆ = L. The signal that arrives at detector j with −M ≤ j ≤M is assumed to be particle-like,
that is for each signal emitted by the source, only one of the 2M + 1 detectors actually fires. Each detector
operates with 100% efficiency, meaning that it fires whenever a particle-like signal arrives.
The result of a run of the experiment is a data set of detector clicks
Υ = {jn| −M ≤ jn ≤M ; n = 1, . . . , N}. (30)
Denoting the total count of detector j by 0 ≤ kj ≤ N , the experiment produces the data set490
D = {k−M , . . . , kM |N = k−M + . . .+ kM} . (31)
6.2. Inference-probability of the data produced by the experiment
A priori, the relation between the unknown location θ of the particle and the location j of the detector
which fires is unknown. Therefore, to describe this relation, we introduce the i-prob P (j|θ, Z) that the
particle at unknown location θ activates the detector located at the position −M ≤ j ≤M . As before, the
conditions represented by Z are fixed and identical for all experiments. As in Sections 4 and 5, the key495
question is what the requirement of reproducibility tells us about the i-prob P (j|θ, Z) as a function of θ.
Note that unlike in the case of parameter estimation, in the case at hand both P (j|θ, Z) and the parameter
θ are unknown.
The following assumptions are essentially the same as those of Sections 4.2 and 5.2 and are listed here
for completeness.500
1. For fixed position θ, the i-prob to observe the data is given by
P (D|θ,N, Z) = P (k−M , . . . , kM |θ,N, Z). (32)
It is assumed that there is no relation between the actual values of jn and jn′ if n 6= n′. In other
words, each repetition of the experiment represents an identical event of which the outcome is logically
independent of any other such event. As mentioned before, events with these properties are called
Bernoulli trials, a concept which is central to many results in probability theory [39, 57, 41]. By the505
standard combinatorial argument, the number of possible ways ND to generate the data set D is given
by
ND =
N !
k−M ! . . . kM !
. (33)
The logical consequence of the Bernoulli-trial assumption is then that
P (D|θ,N, Z) = P (k−M |k−M+1, . . . , kM , θ,N, Z)
×P (k−M+1, . . . , kM |θ,N, Z)
= P (k−M |θ,N, Z)P (k−M+1, . . . , kM |θ,N, Z)
= . . .
= NDP (−M |θ,N, Z)k−M . . . P (M |θ,N, Z)kM
= N !
M∏
j=−M
P (j|θ, Z)kj
kj !
. (34)
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2. In physics we often assume that space is homogeneous, implying that it does not matter where in space
we perform the experiment. For the model at hand, this means that a translation of the unknown position510
θ and the array of detectors by the same distance should not affect our inferences based on the data. In
other words, the i-prob has the property
P (j|θ, Z) = P (j + ζ|θ + ζ, Z), (35)
where ζ is an arbitrary real number.
6.3. Condition for reproducibility and robustness
Comparing Eq. (34) and Eq. (12), it is not a surprise that by simply repeating all the steps that lead to515
Eq. (18), the condition for reproducibility applied to Eq. (34) yields the evidence
Ev = −Nǫ
2
2
M∑
j=−M
1
P (j|θ, Z)
(
∂P (j|θ, Z)
∂θ
)2
+O(ǫ3). (36)
At this point, to make contact with the Schro¨dinger equation which is formulated in continuum space, it is
necessary to replace Eq. (36) by its continuum limit
Ev = −Nǫ
2
2
∫ ∞
−∞
dx
1
P (x|θ, Z)
(
∂P (x|θ, Z)
∂θ
)2
+O(ǫ3), (37)
where we have assumed that the width of the detectors approaches zero (∆→ 0) and the length of the line
segment approaches infinity (L→∞). Making use of translational invariance (see Eq. (35)) we have520
∂P (x|θ, Z)
∂θ
= lim
δ→0
P (x|θ + δ, Z)− P (x|θ, Z)
δ
= lim
δ→0
P (x− δ|θ, Z)− P (x|θ, Z)
δ
= −∂P (x|θ, Z)
∂x
. (38)
Hence, we may replace the partial derivative with respect to θ by the partial derivative with respect to x,
yielding
Ev = −Nǫ
2
2
IF +O(ǫ3), (39)
where
IF =
∫ ∞
−∞
dx
1
P (x|θ, Z)
(
∂P (x|θ, Z)
∂x
)2
, (40)
denotes the Fisher information of the experiment considered in this section. Obviously, minimizing Eq. (40)
as we did for the EPRB and Stern-Gerlach problem cannot yield a solution which incorporates the fact525
that the particle moves in a potential simply because this knowledge is not yet built into the minimization
problem.
According to classical mechanics the orbit in phase space of a particle is given by the solution of the
time-independent Hamilton-Jacobi equation (HJE)
1
2m
(
∂S(θ)
∂θ
)2
+ V (θ)− E = 0, (41)
where m, S(θ), V (θ) and E denote the mass of the particle, the action (Hamilton’s principal function), the530
potential, and the energy, respectively. Note that θ represents the position of the particle which, in classical
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mechanics, is assumed to be known with certainty. The HJE describes experiments for which there is no
uncertainty about each individual event (category 1).
If there is uncertainty about the position θ but not about the individual event (category 2 experiment),
this uncertainty may be captured by assuming that the i-prob P (x|θ, Z), has a particular functional depen-535
dence, e.g. P (x|θ, Z) = exp[−(x − θ)2/2σ2]/
√
2πσ2. Given that the equation which determines the action
S(x) should reduce to Eq. (41) in the limit that P (x|θ, Z)→ δ(x− θ), the simplest equation reads∫ ∞
−∞
dx
[(
∂S(x)
∂x
)2
+ 2m[V (x)− E]
]
P (x|θ, Z) = 0. (42)
In words, Eq. (42) tells us that the inference drawn from the distribution of detector clicks as function of
their location on the line, is that, on average, these locations satisfy the time-independent HJE.
Finally, if there is uncertainty about the individual events as well as about the conditions (category540
3 experiment), the i-prob P (x|θ, Z) is unknown but can be determined by requiring that the frequency
distributions of the observed events are robust (category 3a experiment). It is important to note that in
this case, there is no assumption about the unknown position θ of the particle.
Inspired by Schro¨dinger’s original derivation [87] of his equation (see Section 6.5), we minimize the Fisher
information Eq. (40) with the constraint that the time-independent HJE only holds on average. Specifically,545
the functional to be minimized under the constraint that ∂P (x|θ, Z)/∂θ = −∂P (x|θ, Z)/∂x 6= 0 reads
F (θ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
dx
{
1
P (x|θ, Z)
(
∂P (x|θ, Z)
∂x
)2
+ λ
[(
∂S(x)
∂x
)2
+ 2m[V (x) − E]
]
P (x|θ, Z)
}
,
(43)
where λ is a Lagrange multiplier. It is important to note that without changing the minimization problem,
we may substitute P (x|θ, Z)→ αP (x|θ, Z) where α is any nonzero real number. Therefore, any solution for
P (x|θ, Z) obtained by minimizing Eq. (43) can be normalized by P (x|θ, Z)→ P (x|θ, Z)/ ∫∞−∞ dx P (x|θ, Z).
Hence, there is no need to introduce a Lagrange multiplier to impose the normalization condition on550
P (x|θ, Z).
It is easy to show, directly from Eq. (43), that at an extremum (with respect to variations in P (x|θ, Z)
and S(x), not to θ) the derivative of F (θ) with respect to θ is zero, that is
∂F (θ)
∂θ
∣∣∣∣
Extremum of F (θ)
= 0, (44)
hence the solutions of the variational problem comply with the constraint (C3) (see Section 4.3).
We do not know of any direct analytical method to solve the nonlinear minimization problem Eq. (43).555
However, from Madelung’s hydrodynamic-like formulation [88] or Bohm’s interpretation [3] of quantum
theory it follows that the extrema (and therefore also the minima) of Eq. (43) can be found by solving the
time-independent Schro¨dinger equation.
With a minimum of algebra this can be shown as follows. We start from the functional
Q(θ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
dx
{
4
∂ψ∗(x|θ, Z)
∂x
∂ψ(x|θ, Z)
∂x
+ 2mλ[V (x)− E]ψ∗(x|θ, Z)ψ(x|θ, Z)
}
. (45)
Substituting560
ψ(x|θ, Z) =
√
P (x|θ, Z)eiS(x)
√
λ/2 (46)
yields Eq. (43).
On the other hand, from a standard calculation using the variation ψ∗(x|θ, Z)→ ψ∗(x|θ, Z)+δψ∗(x|θ, Z),
it follows that the extrema of Eq. (45) are given by the solutions of the linear eigenvalue problem,
− ∂
2ψ(x|θ, Z)
∂x2
+
mλ
2
[V (x) − E]ψ(x|θ, Z) = 0, (47)
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which is nothing but the time-independent Schro¨dinger equation with λ = 4/h¯2. Planck’s constant h¯ enters
here because of dimensional reasons (see also Section 6.5) and it sets the energy scale of experiments which565
belong to category 3a. As Eq. (47) is a linear second-order partial differential equation, in practice computing
its solution requires the specification of two boundary conditions on ψ(x|θ, Z).
The equivalence between Eq. (43) and Eq. (45) was established by representing the two real-valued
functions P (x|θ, Z) and S(x) by the complex-valued function ψ(x) [88]. Given a solution ψ(x|θ, Z) of Eq. (47),
it follows that P (x|θ, Z) = |ψ(x|θ, Z)|2 and S(x) = −i ln(ψ(x|θ, Z)/ψ∗(x|θ, Z)) whenever ψ(x|θ, Z) 6= 0.570
Clearly, because of the complex logarithm, the mapping from ψ(x|θ, Z) to the real-valued function S(x) is
not one-to-one [89, 90]. In the hydrodynamic form of quantum theory [88], the ambiguity that ensues has
implications for the interpretation of the gradient of S(x) as a velocity field [89, 90]. As pointed out by
Novikov, similar ambiguities appear in classical mechanics proper if the local equations of motion (Hamilton
equations) are not sufficient to characterize the system completely and the global structure of the phase575
space has to be taken into consideration [91]. However, for the present purpose, this ambiguity has no effect
on the minimization of F (θ) because Eq. (43) does not change if we add to S(x) a real number which does
not depend on x or, equivalently, if we multiply ψ(x|θ, Z) by a global phase factor.
For the experiment considered in the current (and next) section the equation describing the experiment
is Eq. (43), not the Schro¨dinger equation Eq. (47), and the wavefunction ψ(x|θ, Z) is merely a vehicle to580
solve a set of nonlinear equations through the solution of a linear eigenvalue problem. This is logically
consistent with the logical-inference treatment of the EPRB and Stern-Gerlach experiments (see Sections 4
and 5) where there is no need to introduce a “wavefunction” ψ(x|θ, Z) to find closed form solutions.
In the case that the solutions of Eq. (47) are real-valued, we have S(x) = 0 mod 2π. Hence, it would
be sufficient that ψ(x|θ, Z) is a real-valued function. On the other hand, it is a simple matter to repeat585
the derivation and show that minimization of the Fisher information with the constraint that on average,
the HJE of a particle in an electromagnetic field should hold leads to the corresponding time-independent
Schro¨dinger equation (see also Section 7). Then, in general, it is necessary to introduce a complex-valued
function ψ(x|θ, Z) to linearize the minimization problem.
6.4. Discussion590
Starting from the assumptions that the experiment belongs to category 3a and averages of the observed
data complies with Newtonian mechanics, application of logical inference straightforwardly leads to the
time-independent Schro¨dinger equation Eq. (47). The key step in this derivation, which in essence is the
same as in Sections 4 and 5, is to express the robustness of the observed data (distribution of frequencies of
the events) with respect to small variations in the unknown position of the particle, taking into account the595
inference that we draw on the basis of the observed data, namely that on average there is agreement with
Newtonian mechanics.
Of course, a priori there is no good reason to assume that on average there is agreement with Newtonian
mechanics. The only reason to do so here is that only then we recover the time-independent Schro¨dinger
equation. In other words, the time-independent Schro¨dinger equation describes the collective of repeated600
experiments of category 3a subject to the condition that the averaged observations comply with Newtonian
mechanics. The question what kind of equations are obtained by assuming a different kind of “mechanics”
is out of the scope of the present paper.
It is very important to emphasize that from the logical-inference viewpoint the superposition principle,
that is, the linearity of the Schro¨dinger equation, is not fundamental but follows from the fact that in classical605
mechanics the kinetic energy is quadratic in the velocities and, thus, in the momenta. Only in this case
the substitution of Eq. (46) reduces the nonlinear minimization problem to a linear equation. This raises
the question what to do with different types of classical mechanics, such as relativistic mechanics. It is well
known, that relativistic quantum mechanics cannot be mechanics, it can only be a field theory [92, 93, 94],
the argument being that any attempt to measure the coordinate of a particle with the accuracy better610
than its Compton wavelength unavoidably leads to the creation of particle-antiparticle pairs. We leave the
challenging problem of extending the present work to the relativistic domain for future research.
A comment on the identification λ = 4/h¯2 is in order. Clearly, from a dimensional analysis of Eq. (47), λ
has to be a parameter with the dimension of h¯−2 but there is no a-priori reason why we must have λ = 4/h¯2.
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However, comparing the results of a numerical calculation based on Eq. (47) with specific experimental615
results for the spectra of atoms etc., we are forced to choose λ = 4/h¯2. It is worth mentioning here that
the logical-inference derivation of the canonical ensemble of statistical mechanics [58, 59] employs the same
reasoning to relate the inverse temperature β = 1/kBT to the average thermal energy. At this point it
should be mentioned that recent work has shown that h¯ may be eliminated from the basic equations of
(low-energy) physics by a re-definition of the units of mass, time, etc. [95, 96].620
A very important point, which renders our treatment very different from other statistical formulations
of quantum theory [8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 19, 20, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31, 32, 33] is that the unknown position of the
particle θ never appears in the solution of the problem. It appears as a condition on the i-probs but it has
no effect on the functional dependence of the i-probs on the relevant, observable coordinate x.
From quantum theory we know that Eq. (47) usually has more than one solution, the minimum of625
Eq. (45) corresponding to the quantum state with the lowest energy and the others being excited states.
The latter correspond to extrema of Eq. (43) with values of F (θ) that are larger than the minimum value
of F (θ).
From Eq. (44) it also follows that the excited quantum states describe experiments which are not the
“most” robust against small changes of θ but nevertheless have the property that, to first order, the “quality”630
of the results (i.e. averages, etc.) does not depend on the particular value of θ.
If we were to follow the tradition of conventional statistics, we would introduce, for instance, an estimator
θ̂(x) for θ and assume that the expectation value of this estimator relates to the “true” position of the
particle. As we know from the early days of the development of quantum theory [97] trying to interpret
such estimators as objective properties of the particle creates seemingly endless possibilities for different635
interpretations, paradoxes, and mysteries [42]. From the viewpoint of logical inference, θ was and remains
unknown and any attempt to interpret the function ψ(x) seems superfluous; ψ(x) is just an extremely useful
vehicle to compute the numerical values of the i-probs P (x|θ, Z).
6.5. Historical note
It is of interest to repeat here the first few steps in Schro¨dinger’s first paper on his equation [87]. For640
simplicity, we consider a particle moving on a line only. Schro¨dinger starts from the time-independent HJE.
H
(
x,
∂S(x)
∂x
)
= E, (48)
where
H
(
x,
∂S(x)
∂x
)
=
1
2m
(
∂S(x)
∂x
)2
+ V (x), (49)
is the Hamiltonian of the classical, Newtonian particle. Then, in Eq. (48) he substitutes
S(x) = K lnψ(x), (50)
where ψ(x) is assumed to be a real single-valued function of x and K is a constant with the dimension of
action and obtains645
H
(
x,
K
ψ(x)
∂ψ(x)
∂x
)
= E. (51)
Then, Schro¨dinger observes that one can rewrite Eq. (51) as a quadratic form in ψ(x), namely
K2
2m
(
∂ψ(x)
∂x
)2
+ [V (x)− E]ψ2(x) = 0. (52)
Of course, solving Eq. (52) for ψ(x) does not bring anything new. Therefore, Schro¨dinger postulates that
instead of solving Eq. (52), one should search for the extrema of the functional
Q =
∫ +∞
−∞
dx
[
K2
2m
(
∂ψ(x)
∂x
)2
+ [V (x)− E]ψ2(x)
]
, (53)
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knowing that the formal solution of this variational problem leads to an eigenvalue problem. He then
continues to show that by using the classical Hamiltonian for the Kepler problem, the solution of the650
eigenvalue problem yields the spectrum of the hydrogen atom.
It is quite remarkable that in his next publication on the subject [98], Schro¨dinger calls both the ansatz
Eq. (50) and the transition from Eq. (52) to Eq. (53) incomprehensible (“unversta¨ndlich”) and then goes on
to motivate his equation using the analogy with optics. As shown by our derivation of Eq. (47), which on
choosing λ = 4K−2 is the same as Eq. (52), from the viewpoint of logical inference applied to experiments655
of category 3a, there is nothing incomprehensible to Eq. (53).
7. Time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation
Extending the reasoning which yields the time-independent Schro¨dinger equation to the time-dependent,
multidimensional case does not require new concepts but simply replacing the position on the line by a
vector in 3D space and adding time labels does not suffice. Therefore, in what follows, we focus on those660
aspects which are absent in the examples treated in Sections 4–6.
7.1. Experiment
We consider N repetitions of a thought experiment on a particle moving in a d-dimensional hypercube Ω
of linear extent [−L,L], relative to a fixed reference frame. Here and in the following d is a positive integer.
A source emits a signal at discrete times labeled by the integer τ = 1, . . . ,M . It is assumed that for each665
repetition, the particle is at the unknown position θτ ∈ Ω. As the particle receives the signal, it responds
by emitting another signal which is recorded by an array of detectors. For each signal emitted by a particle
the data recorded by the detector system is used to determine the position jn,τ of a voxel of linear extent
[−∆,∆] in the d-dimensional space Ω. The dimension of the voxels determines the spatial resolution of the
detection system. As in Section 6, in a later stage, we will let ∆→ 0 to solve the problem analytically.670
The result of N repetitions of the experiment yields the data set
Υ = {jn,τ |jn,τ ∈ [−Ld, Ld]; n = 1, . . . , N ; τ = 1, . . . ,M}, (54)
or, denoting the total counts of voxels j at time τ by 0 ≤ kj,τ ≤ N , the experiment produces the data set
D =
{
kj,τ
∣∣∣τ = 1, . . . ,M ;N = ∑
j∈[−Ld,Ld]
kj,τ
}
. (55)
7.2. Inference-probability of the data produced by the experiment
In analogy with the procedure followed in the previous sections, we introduce the i-prob P (j|θ, τ, Z) to
describe the relation between the unknown location θ and the location j of the voxel determined by the675
detector system at discrete time τ . Except for the unknown location θ, all other experimental conditions
are represented by Z and are assumed to be fixed and identical for all experiments. Note that unlike in the
case of parameter estimation, in the case at hand both P (j|θ, τ, Z) and the parameter θ are unknown. As
in all examples treated so far, the key question is what the requirement of reproducibility tells us about the
i-prob P (j|θ, τ, Z) as a function of θ.680
The following assumptions are essentially the same as those of Sections 4.2, 5.2, and 6.2.
1. It is assumed that each repetition of the experiment represents an identical event of which the outcome
is logically independent of any other such event. By application of the product rule, the consequence of
this assumption is that
P (D|θ1, . . . , θM , N, Z) = N !
M∏
τ=1
∏
j∈[−Ld,Ld]
P (j|θτ , τ, Z)kj,τ
kj,τ !
. (56)
2. As in Section 6.2, we assume that space is homogeneous. This implies that the i-prob has the property685
P (j|θ, Z) = P (j + ζ|θ + ζ, Z), (57)
where ζ is an arbitrary vector in d-dimensional space.
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7.3. Condition for reproducibility and robustness
In Sections 4.2, 5.2 and 6.2 the variable condition θ is a scalar variable whereas in the present case, θ
denotes a collection of d scalars. This has some impact on the expression for the evidence. Repeating the
steps that took us from Eq. (14) to Eq. (18), we find that690
Ev =
∑
j,τ
d∑
i,i′=1
ǫi,τ ǫi′,τ
P (j|θτ , τ, Z)
∂P (j|θτ , τ, Z)
∂θi
∂P (j|θτ , τ, Z)
∂θi′
, (58)
where we have dropped the irrelevant prefactor −N/2 and omitted from the summation sign the range of τ
and j (see Eq. (56)) and the terms of third and higher order in the ǫ’s.
The condition for reproducibility applied to Eq. (58) requires that we minimize Ev (which is non-negative,
see Eq. (59)). A minor problem thereby is that the ǫi’s are arbitrary (but small) but we can get around this
problem by noting that695
Ev =
∑
j,τ
(
d∑
i=1
ǫi, τ√
P (j|θτ , τ, Z)
∂P (j|θτ , τ, Z)
∂θi
)2
≥ 0, (59)
and, by using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, that
Ev ≤
∑
j,τ
(
d∑
i=1
ǫ2i,τ
)(
d∑
i=1
1
P (j|θτ , τ, Z)
(
∂P (j|θτ , τ, Z)
∂θi
)2)
≤ dǫ̂2
∑
j,τ
d∑
i=1
1
P (j|θτ , τ, Z)
(
∂P (j|θτ , τ, Z)
∂θi
)2
, (60)
where ǫ̂2 = maxi,τ ǫ
2
i,τ . From Eq. (60) it follows that as the ǫi’s are arbitrary (but small), minimizing the
rightmost factor in Eq. (60) is the best we can do to make sure that Ev is as small as possible. Therefore,
we find that in order to realize the condition for reproducibility we have to minimize the Fisher information
IF =
∑
j,τ
d∑
i=1
1
P (j|θτ , τ, Z)
(
∂P (j|θτ , τ, Z)
∂θi
)2
, (61)
subject to additional constraints that we impose (see below).700
As before, to make contact with the Schro¨dinger equation which is formulated in continuum space-time,
it is necessary to replace sums over space-time coordinates by integrals. Invoking translational invariance
(see Section 7.2), we have
IF =
∫
dx
∫
dt
d∑
i=1
1
P (x|θ(t), t, Z)
(
∂P (x|θ(t), t, Z)
∂xi
)2
, (62)
where x = (x1, . . . , xd).
We include the knowledge that the particle moves in a time-dependent electromagnetic field and time-705
dependent potential by repeating the steps of Section 6 that lead us from Eq. (41) to Eq. (43), that is we
start from the classical HJE and then account for the uncertainties about the events.
According to classical mechanics, the motion of a particle with mass m in a time-dependent electromag-
netic field and time-dependent potential is governed by the time-dependent HJE
∂S(θ, t)
∂t
+
1
2m
(
∇S(θ, t)− q
c
A(θ, t)
)2
+ V (θ, t) = 0, (63)
where q denotes the electrical charge of the particle, c is the velocity of light in vacuum, A(x, t) represents the710
vector potential and the electrical potential and all potentials of non-electromagnetic origin are collectively
denoted by V (x, t).
21
Using the same argument as the one in Section 6, if there is uncertainty about the position θ but not
about the individual event (category 2 experiment), the simplest equation for S(x, t) which reduces to
Eq. (63) in the limit that there is no uncertainty reads715 ∫ ∞
−∞
dx
[
∂S(x, t)
∂t
+
1
2m
(
∇S(x, t)− q
c
A(x, t)
)2
+ V (x, t)
]
P (x|θ(t), t, Z) = 0, (64)
for each value of t. If there is uncertainty about both the individual event and the conditions (category 3
experiment), the i-prob P (x|θ(t), t, Z) is unknown but can be determined by requiring that the frequency
distributions of the observed events are robust (category 3a experiment). Note that no assumption about
the unknown position θ of the particle has been or will be made and that this line of reasoning, which is
reminiscent of Ehrenfest’s theorem [99], does not determine P (x|θ(t), t, Z) but merely provides a constraint720
on it.
Minimizing the Fisher information Eq. (62) with the constraint Eq. (64) amounts to minimizing the
functional
F =
∫
dx
∫
dt
d∑
i=1
{
1
P (x|θ(t), t, Z)
(
∂P (x|θ(t), t, Z)
∂xi
)2
+λ
[
∂S(x, t)
∂t
+
1
2m
(
∂S(x, t)
∂xi
− q
c
A(x, t)
)2
+ V (x, t)
]
P (x|θ(t), t, Z)
}
, (65)
where λ is a Lagrange parameter and the normalization of P (x|θ(t), t, Z) can be taken care of by exploiting
the invariance of the extrema of Eq. (65) with respect to the rescaling transformation P (x|θ(t), t, Z) →725
αP (x|θ(t), t, Z). Note that the integrand of Eq. (65) is invariant for the gauge transformation A(x, t) →
A(x, t) + (q/c)∇χ(x, t), V (x, t) → V (x, t) − (q/c)∂χ(x, t)/∂t, and S(x, t) → S(x, t) + (q/c)χ(x, t) where
χ(x, t) is an arbitrary scalar function [100].
As in Section 6, it follows that finding the extrema of the functional Eq. (65) is tantamount to solving
the time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation (TDSE). Applying the standard variational argument, it follows730
that the solutions of the TDSE
ih¯
∂ψ(x|θ(t), t, Z)
∂t
=
− h¯2
2m
d∑
j=1
(
∂
∂xj
− iq
h¯c
A(x, t)
)2
+ V (x, t)
ψ(x|θ(t), t, Z), (66)
are the extrema of the functional
Q = 2
∫
dx
∫
dt
{
mi
√
λ
[
ψ(x|θ(t), t, Z)∂ψ
∗(x|θ(t), t, Z)
∂t
− ψ∗(x|θ(t), t, Z)∂ψ(x|θ(t), t, Z)
∂t
]
+2
d∑
j=1
(
∂ψ∗(x|θ(t), t, Z)
∂xj
+
iq
√
λ
2c
Aj(x, t)ψ
∗(x|θ(t), t, Z)
)
×
(
∂ψ(x|θ(t), t, Z)
∂xj
− iq
√
λ
2c
Aj(x, t)ψ(x|θ(t), t, Z)
)
+mλV (x, t)ψ∗(x|θ(t), t, Z)ψ(x|θ(t), t, Z)
}
, (67)
if λ = 4/h¯2. The equivalence of Eq. (65) and Eq. (67) follows by substituting ψ(x|θ(t), t, Z) =
√
P (x|θ(t), t, Z)eiS(x,t)
√
λ/2.
Note that the solutions of Eq. (66) do not depend on the unknown position θ(t), as it should be. As in
the case of the SE (see Section 6), it follows that the solutions of the variational problem comply with the735
constraint (C3) (see Section 4.3).
The functional Eq. (67) inherits from Eq. (65) the invariance under gauge transformations. Specifi-
cally, it is easy to show that the integrand in Eq. (67) does not change by substituting A(x, t)→ A(x, t) +
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(q
√
λ/2c)∇χ(x, t), V (x, t)→ V (x, t)−(q/c)∂χ(x, t)/∂t, and ψ(x|θ(t), t, Z)→ ψ(x|θ(t), t, Z) exp[iq
√
λχ(x, t)/2c]
where χ(x, t) is an arbitrary scalar function.740
Instead of solving the nonlinear differential equation that follows from extremizing Eq. (65), it is usually
more expedient to solve the linear partial differential equation Eq. (66). Of course, in practice we need
to specify ψ(x|θ(t), t, Z) at t = 0 in order to solve the initial-value problem Eq. (66). Unlike in the time-
independent case (see Section 6) where we may have solutions for which S(x) = 0 mod 2π, in the general
case, the equivalence between Eq. (65) and Eq. (67) cannot be established unless we allow ψ(x|θ(t), t, Z)745
to be complex-valued. In general, minimizing Eq. (65) yields solutions for the two real-valued functions
P (x|θ(t), t, Z) and S(x, t) and although we can represent these two functions in a variety of ways, the
complex-valued representation in terms of ψ(x|θ(t), t, Z) offers the for computational reasons very important
advantage that it transforms a nonlinear optimization problem into a linear one.
The equivalence of Eq. (65) and Eq. (67) allows us to determine, from the solutions of the TDSE, the750
i-probs P (x|θ(t), t, Z) which yield the most likely and most reproducible data, collected in the experiment
described in Section 7.1. Put differently, through the TDSE, quantum theory describes an experiment which
yields data that is the most robust with respect to small variations of the external conditions (the unknown
positions of the particle) under which the experiment is being performed.
7.4. Discussion755
In essence, all the points that were mentioned in the discussions in Sections 4 – 6 also hold for the
time-dependent case. Of course, one should replace for instance “time-independent” by “time-dependent”,
but otherwise there are no significant conceptual changes.
Having shown how basic results of quantum theory follow from the application of logical inference
to experiments of category 3a, it is appropriate to compare our approach to the considerable body of760
work [8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 19, 20, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31, 32, 33] which shows that quantum theory can be cast
into a “classical” statistical theory.
Central in the derivations presented in the present paper is the appearance of the Fisher information.
Therefore, it is instructive to compare the methodology adopted in the present paper with the ones of earlier
works [8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 20, 27, 28, 31, 32, 33] in which it is de facto postulated that the Fisher information765
is the basic expression from which the equations of theoretical physics can be derived.
To the best of our knowledge, the idea of postulating that the Fisher information is the starting point
for deriving the time-independent Schro¨dinger equation appeared for the first time in a paper by Frieden [8]
who also showed that the Heisenberg-Robertson inequalities, often regarded as a landmark of quantum
mechanics, directly follow from the Crame´r-Rao inequality [8, 11, 13, 14, 20, 27, 28, 32], a standard result770
in classical statistics [14, 101].
The expressions of functionals akin Eq. (65) are justified using arguments from estimation theory, and
concepts such as intrinsic fluctuations and “smart measurements”. Thereby, it seems essential that the
difference between the parameter to be estimated (e.g. θ(t) in our notation) and the measured quantity
(e.g. x) may be interpreted as intrinsic fluctuations.775
These earlier works [8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 20, 27, 28, 31, 32, 33] have been instrumental for the development
of our logical-inference approach. But in contrast to these earlier works in which the Fisher information
is postulated as the starting point, in the logical-inference approach the Fisher information appears quite
naturally as a result of expressing the requirement that the experiment yields reproducible, robust results.
Thereby the notion of robustness used in the present paper refers to the effect of small (systematic) changes780
of a parameter on the state of knowledge encoded in the i-probs and is conceptually very different from the
one introduced by Hall which expresses resilience with respect to noise [11].
We further illustrate the conceptual differences between the logical-inference approach and the Fisher-
information approach using two concrete examples. First, consider Frieden’s treatment of the EPRB ex-
periment [14] in which the angle θ between the two unit vectors corresponding to the directions of the two785
routers that are controlled by the experimenter is regarded as the variable-to-be-estimated. From the point
of view of laboratory experiments this seems to be a rather artificial starting point. Indeed, we do not know
of any real EPRB experiment which attempts to estimate this angle (which experimenters consider to be
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known). Moreover, mathematically we cannot even define the difference between the observed event {x, y}
and the “estimated” angle θ, let alone that we can interpret this difference as a signature of intrinsic fluctu-790
ations. Yet, as we have shown in Section 4, straightforward application of logical inference to an experiment
assumed to belong to category 3a, effortlessly yields the equations of the quantum theoretical description
for this experiment. Next, as another example illustrating the conceptual differences, consider Reginatto’s
derivation of the time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation [10], the algebra of which has been our source of
inspiration to connect Eq. (65) and Eq. (66). From the point of view of probability theory, the justification795
of Reginatto’s derivation is problematic. In Ref. [10] the Fisher information (matrix) is introduced in the
conventional manner [14], namely as an information measure of estimating a parameter θ from the observed
random variable y = θ+x, x representing the additive noise. Then, in the next step, the noise x is tactically
taken as the position of the particle(s), a remarkable reinterpretation of mathematical symbols. Logical
difficulties of this kind are absent in the logical inference approach simply because it is not permitted to800
drop conditional dependences of the i-probs.
In short, the main conceptual difference with earlier works that start by postulating expressions con-
taining the Fisher information [8, 11, 13, 14, 20, 27, 28, 32], is that in the logical inference approach the
expression to be minimized is not postulated but it is derived by assuming that the theory describes repro-
ducible experiments in the most robust possible way.805
8. Conclusion
We have shown that the basic equations of quantum theory derive from logical inference applied to
experiments in which there is uncertainty about individual events but for which the frequencies of events
are reproducible and most insensitive to small variations of the unknown factors.
The derivations presented in Sections 4–7 demonstrate that logical inference, that is plausible reasoning,810
applied to experiments which belong to
Category 3a. There is uncertainty about each event, the conditions under which the experiment is carried
out may be uncertain, and the frequencies with which events are observed are reproducible
and robust against small changes in the conditions,
yields two important, general results.815
The first is the justification of the intuitive procedure to assign to the i-probs the frequencies for the
events to occur. For fixed experimental conditions, the usual argument for adopting this assignment is that
it maximizes the i-prob to observe these frequencies (see the Appendix A). On the other hand, it is quite
natural to expect that under variable experimental conditions it is the most robust, reproducible experiment
which produces the most likely frequencies of events. Obviously, the argument based on reproducibility820
under variable experimental conditions is more general as it contains the condition of fixed experimental
conditions as a special case.
The second, and most important for the purpose of recovering the quantum theoretical description
as an application of logical inference, are equations that determine the functional dependence of the i-
probs on the condition that is considered to be variable. Application of exactly the same procedure to the825
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm experiment, the Stern-Gerlach experiment, and experiments on a particle
in a potential demonstrate that the equations known from the quantum theoretical description of these
experiments follow in a straightforward manner without invoking concepts of quantum theory.
The key point in the derivation of the quantum theoretical description is to express precisely and unam-
biguously, using the mathematical framework of plausible reasoning [37, 38, 39, 40, 41], the essential features830
of experiments belonging to category 3a. Adding the requirement that the experimental results are insensi-
tive to small changes of the conditions under which the experiment is carried out yields equations that are
known from quantum theory. Furthermore, it also explains that if it is difficult to engineer nanoscale devices
which operate in a regime where the data is reproducible, it is also difficult to perform these experiments
such that the data complies with quantum theory.835
In our logical inference derivation of the time-independent and time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation
we did not assume that the former can be deduced from the latter: both emerge as descriptions of the
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data obtained from different kinds of experiments. Once both descriptions have been formulated in terms
of quadratic forms, the machinery of linear algebra brings out the equivalence of these two descriptions.
However, from a logical-inference viewpoint, there is no a-priori reason why this connection should exist and840
therefore it is a logical, not physical, requirement that the logical inference approach can be applied to the
time-independent and time-dependent data without assuming that there is a deeper relation between the
two. In a sense, the mathematical relationship that appears is a result of logical inference. As mentioned in
the introduction, this way of thinking is different from the deductive, reductionist approach. For instance,
it has recently been suggested that starting from real-valued Majorana-fermion equations, one can derive845
the complex-valued Weyl equation, then reduce it to the Dirac equation from which the time-dependent
Schro¨dinger equation follows by taking the non-relativistic limit [102]. In the reductionist approach, a
description of the observed phenomena at low energy emerges from an appropriate low-energy approximation
of the underlying high-energy model [102]. In contrast, in the logical inference approach, we take the point
of view that a description of our knowledge of the phenomena at a certain level is independent of the850
description at a more detailed level. Of course, this implies that it should be possible to show that e.g. the
Dirac and Klein–Gordon equation can be obtained by logical inference applied to data collected in some
(thought) experiment, without making any reductionist detour. Clearly, such a demonstration would be a
very important step for establishing the usefulness of the logical inference as a methodology to construct
descriptions of observed phenomena.855
The logical-inference methodology to derive the basic equations of quantum theory has some implications
for interpretational aspects of quantum theory. First, although it supports Bohr’s view expressed in quotes
(1–3) of the introduction, it does not support the Copenhagen interpretation (in any form) [42]. Indeed,
the wavefunction Eq. (46) merely appears to be a purely mathematical vehicle to turn nonlinear differential
equations into linear ones and it seems difficult to attribute more meaning to such a vehicle other than860
mathematical. On the other hand, there is no conflict with the statistical interpretation [82, 103] if we
ignore the conceptual difference between i-probs and “mathematical” probabilities. Second, it follows that
quantum theory is a “common sense” description of the vast class of experiments that belongs to category
3a. Quantum theory definitely does not describe what is happening to a particle, say. This follows most
clearly from our derivation of the Schro¨dinger equation, which shows that quantum theory does not provide865
any insight into the motion of a particle but instead describes all what can be inferred (within the framework
of logical inference) from or, using Bohr’s words, said about the observed data, in complete agreement with
Bohr’s view expressed in quotes (1–3) of the introduction.
The logical-inference derivation of the quantum theoretical description does not, in any way, prohibit the
construction of cause-and-effect mechanisms that, when analyzed in the same manner as in real experiments,870
create the impression that the system behaves as prescribed by quantum theory [5, 7, 104]. From Bohr’s
quote (1) reproduced in the introduction, and as demonstrated in a mathematically rigorous manner in the
present paper, quantum theory is but an abstract description, be it a very powerful one. As mentioned
in Section 3, it is straightforward to construct computer simulation models that mimic, for all practical
purposes almost perfectly, experiments that belong to category 3a. Work in this direction, for a review875
see Ref. [105], has shown that it is indeed possible to build simulation models which reproduce, on an
event-by-event basis, (quantum) interference and entanglement phenomena.
Summarizing: In line with Bohr’s statement that “Physics concerns what we can say about nature [45]”,
the aim of physics is to provide a consistent description of relations between certain classes of events. Some
of these relations express cause followed by an effect and others do not. If there are uncertainties about880
the individual events and the conditions under which the experiment is carried out, situations may arise in
which it becomes difficult or even impossible to establish relations between individual events. In the case
that the frequencies of these events are reproducible and robust, it may still be possible to establish relations,
not between the individual events, but between the frequency distributions of the observed events. As we
have demonstrated, it is precisely under these circumstances that the application of logical inference to the885
(abstraction of) the experiment yields the basic equations of quantum theory. This then also explains the
reason for the extraordinary descriptive power of quantum theory: it is plausible reasoning, that is common
sense, applied to reproducible and robust experimental data. The algebra of logical inference facilitates this
reasoning by means of a mathematically precise language which is unambiguous and independent of the
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Appendix A. Maximum of the inference-probability895
We consider an experiment with logically independent outcomes O1, . . . , Om which is repeated N times
under constant conditions represented by the proposition Z. The i-prob that the outcome Ok occurred nk
times reads
P (n1, . . . , nm|N,Z) = N !
n1! . . . nm!
P (O1|N,Z)n1 . . . P (Om|N,Z)nm . (A.1)
Let us denote the set of values of {n1, . . . , nm} which maximizes P (n1, . . . , nm|N,Z) by {n∗1, . . . , n∗m}. Then,
we must have900
P (n∗1, . . . , n
∗
k, . . . , n
∗
m|N,Z)
P (n∗1 + 1, . . . , n
∗
k − 1, . . . , n∗m|N,Z)
=
n∗1 + 1
n∗k
P (Ok|N,Z)
P (O1|N,Z) ≥ 1, (A.2)
or
n∗kP (O1|N,Z) ≤ (n∗1 + 1)P (Ok|N,Z), (A.3)
for all 2 ≤ k ≤ m. Summing over all k yields
P (O1|N,Z)
m∑
k=2
n∗k ≤ (n∗1 + 1)
m∑
k=2
P (Ok|N,Z),
or
P (O1|N,Z)(N − n∗1) ≤ (n∗1 + 1)(1− P (O1|N,Z)),
or
P (O∗1 |N,Z) ≤
n∗1 + 1
N + 1
. (A.4)
Similarly, if we consider
P (n∗1, . . . , n
∗
k, . . . , n
∗
m|N,Z)
P (n∗1 − 1, . . . , n∗k + 1, . . . , n∗m|N,Z)
=
n∗k + 1
n∗1
P (O1|N,Z)
P (Ok|N,Z) ≥ 1, (A.5)
we find
P (O1|N,Z) ≥ n
∗
1
N +m− 1 . (A.6)
In the derivation that leads to Eqs. (A.4) and (A.6), our choice of the pair (1, k) (2 ≤ k) was arbitrary.905
Repeating the derivation for 1 ≤ j, k ≤ m with k 6= j yields
n∗j
N +m− 1 ≤ P (Oj |N,Z) ≤
n∗j + 1
N + 1
, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, (A.7)
or equivalently
P (Oj |N,Z)− 1
N + 1
≤ n
∗
j
N + 1
≤ P (Oj |N,Z)
(
1 +
m− 2
N + 1
)
, (A.8)
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
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For sufficiently large N , it follows from Eq. (A.7) that for an experiment with logically independent
outcomes O1, . . . , Om which is repeated N times under constant conditions represented by the proposition910
Z, the assignment
P (Oj |N,Z)← nj
N + 1
, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, (A.9)
maximizes the i-prob that Oj occurs nj times for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
The derivation of the assignment Eq. (A.9) justifies the intuitive procedure to take as the numerical
values of the i-probs, the frequencies of occurrences, if the latter are known through actual measurement.
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